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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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Thailand-Cambodia: Thai leaders appear receptive to recent Cambodian overtures to improve relations.

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Longstanding differences between the two countries, aggravated by personal animosities, will make progress toward rapprochement slow. Sihanouk, for example, is still demanding a Thai border declaration, while some Thai leaders still put the onus on Sihanouk for breaking relations in the first place. The scaling down of Bangkok's support to anti-Cambodian guerrillas in recent months, although dictated in large measure by domestic considerations, will reduce a major point of friction between the two countries, however.

For Sihanouk, the initiatives toward Thailand are only part of a broader attempt to lay the groundwork for the postwar situation. In addition to softening his attitude toward the US, there are indications that Sihanouk has also made overtures to the Laotian Government, which now is considering making a statement recognizing the Laos-Cambodia border. So far, however, Sihanouk has given no indication that he intends to make any gesture toward the government in Saigon.

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Iran: The Shah has reacted angrily to the Western oil consortium's offer of \$906 million in oil revenue for the Iranian year that begins this month.

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[redacted] in his present mood the Shah might force punitive legislation through the Iranian parliament. Although this would hurt the consortium, it would not guarantee achievement of the Shah's immediate oil revenue goal--\$1 billion for the coming year--and might even endanger the present level of earnings.

A "moratorium" in the talks proposed by the Iranian side might allow the Shah's temper to cool. In addition, despite the present display of firmness by the consortium, the moratorium could provide an opportunity for behind-the-scenes maneuvering leading toward an eventual compromise.

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